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Notes

THE EXPANDING LIABILITY OF
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS
Since the infancy of aviation, individuals injured as a result of
flight in aircraft have sought some basis by which they might be
reimbursed for their loss. Their quest had, in the earliest attempts,
sought a compensation system analogous to existing systems like
maritime and automobile negligence law. Within a brief passage
of time, negligence emerged as the most common theory under
which recovery was sought.'
A significant portion of the litigation that has resulted from aircraft accidents has involved Air Traffic Control (ATC), that function within the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) charged
with the safe control of aircraft flight. The various activities necessary for safe aircraft flight include preventing collisions between
aircraft, maintaining an orderly flow of air traffic, providing advice and information to the pilot in command and notifying search
and rescue organizations in the event of emergency. To accomplish
these tasks, ATC is divided into three functional categories: terminal air traffic controllers, enroute traffic controllers and flight service air traffic specialists. Each of these categories has specific responsibilities that, when coordinated, permit ATC to accomplish
the mission assigned to it.'
To understand the relationship between these categories, a brief
hypothetical journey in an aircraft will be helpful. After boarding
a commercial carrier at the airport, the plane is taxied (after a
proper clearance from the ground controller, one of the three terminal controller functions) to the runway threshold. At this time,
'Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d 384 (1962).
'Smerdon

v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 929, 931 (D. Mass. 1955).

'The duties and responsibilities of each category may be determined by reference to the following FAA Handbooks: (a) Terminal Air Traffic Control,
7110.8C, dated January 1, 1973, (b) Enroute Air Traffic Control, 7110.9C, dated
January 1, 1973, and (c) Flight Services, 7110.10B, dated January 1, 1973. The
statutory basis for ATC responsibility is the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49
U.S.C. § 1301-1542 (1970).
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the pilot is operating under the instructions of the airport traffic
controller (another terminal controller) and is granted a clearance
to take-off. Once airborne, the aircraft remains under the control
of the airport traffic controller until it is beyond the limits of the
airport control zone.' As the plane passes out of the airport control
zone it is "handed off" first to the departure controller (the last
terminal controller) and then to the enroute traffic controller, from
whom the pilot receives his instructions regarding altitude, weather
and traffic information. As the plane passes over various parts of
the country, it is "handed off" to each of the successive enroute
traffic controllers (who are communicating with the pilot from one
of the air route traffic control centers [ARTCC], one of which
exists in each geographical section into which the country is divided). As the flight nears its destination, there is another "hand
off" to the approach controller who directs the aircraft into position for entry into the airport traffic. At this time, there is yet
another "hand off" to the airport traffic controller who sequences
the aircraft for landing and grants a final clearance. Once landed,
the ground controller directs the plane's movements to its berth.
Since the majority of commercial carrier flights are operated
under instrument flight rules (IFR),' only those ATC categories
that are involved in IFR operations were mentioned. Had the hypothetical flight been conducted under visual flight rules (VFR),' the
environment in which most general aviation operations occur, the
pilot would have received instructions and weather information
only from the ground controller, airport traffic controller and flight

IFederal Aviation Adm., 14 C.F.R. § 71.11 (1973): "The control zones . . .
consist of controlled airspace which extends upward from the surface of the earth
and terminates at the base of the continental control area. A control zone . . .

is normally a circular area with a radius of five miles and any extensions necessary to include instrument approach and departure paths."

Under IFR, ATC directs virtually every movement of the aircraft by radio
commands to the pilot regarding altitude, speed, rate of descent and glide slope.

The system is necessary for flight during times when the pilot's visibility is impaired by clouds, fog, rain, or other adverse weather and for commercial aviation. Federal Aviation Adm., 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.115-91.129 (1973).
0
VFR conditions are best thought of as those involving "good" weather. Federal Aviation Adm., 14 C.F.R. § 91.105 (1973). Regulations (c) and (d)(1) state
that for aircraft operation within a control zone a ceiling of at least 1,000 feet
is required and take-offs or landings are prohibited whenever ground visibility is
less than three statute miles. For a more detailed explanation of IFR and VFR,
see generally Atwell, Government Liability for Negligence of Air Trafgic Controllers, 13 S. TEx. L. J. 41 (1972).
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service air traffic specialist. In addition, there is another significant
difference between IFR and VFR; this distinction may be termed
"control." Under IFR, the aircraft is controlled in all its movements in that direction, altitude, climbs and descents are directed
by ATC. Conversely, under VFR, the pilot is the controlling agent
for these activities unless he is operating within a control zone;
generally, the VFR pilots' responsibility for safety is to see and
avoid other aircraft.
The air traffic control system is exceedingly complex. To grasp
an understanding of ATC's duties and the circumstances under
which the organization will be found liable for aviation accidents,
a three-fold analysis must be made. Inquiry will first be directed
into the past history and trend in the relationship between ATC
and aircraft accidents. Then, the weakening of the traditional defenses that have been a corollary to the expansion in liability will
be evaluated. In this regard, emphasis is placed upon the importance of the factual situation surrounding the accident as a determinant of liability. Finally, there will be an examination of some
of the possible ramifications of this expansion of liability.!

I.

EXPANSION OF

ATC

LIABILITY-A HISTORY AND

PRESENT TRENDS

A. Landings
In 1955, the landmark case of Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust
Co.8 established that the exemptions of the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA)8 do not preclude recovery against the government
for ATC negligence in clearing two aircraft for landing on the same
"An important parameter under which this inquiry was conducted is that no
attempt is made to distinguish among the various categories of ATC. Instead, the
term "ATC" shall mean any of the three functional categories. From the hypothetical aircraft flight depicted earlier, however, it may be readily ascertained
which control function is involved.
8221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955), afl'd sub nom., United States v. Union Trust

Co., 350 U.S. 907 (1955).
928 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970): "Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of
this title, the district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions
on claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after

January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused
by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government
while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances

where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred."

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

runway. Since that decision, the question no longer relates to the
existence of a duty owed the pilot, but to the scope of the duty.
Subsequent to the Eastern Air Lines decision, litigation dealing
with aircraft accidents and ATC involvement agonizingly attempted
to mold guidelines within the traditional concepts of negligence
e.g., proximate cause and contributory negligence. This apparent
compulsion by the courts to adhere to traditional concepts, although
perhaps a manifestation of the uncertainty with which they viewed
their entry into the field, has created an entanglement of judicial
logic that complicates analysis on either a sequential or specific
situation basis. As a result, an artificial framework must be adopted
and an attempt made to mold the decisional results to the structure.
By far the majority of cases involving ATC liability have been
based on accidents that have occurred during the attempted landing of aircraft. This is understandable when it is realized that it
is during this critical stage of the flight that the pilot is most dependent upon ATC for instructions and assistance. Meanwhile,
ATC is at this time most preoccupied with the regulation of air
traffic within the relatively confined space of the airport control
zone. It is the interaction of these factors then, pilot dependence
and ATC preoccupation, that creates a situation most conducive
to accidents.
Although existence of a duty had been recognized, there was
initially an apparent reluctance on the part of the courts to establish the duty of ATC to pilots beyond that of maintaining aircraft
separation." Moreover, the clearance provided by ATC was determined to be permissive, rather than obligatory, and did not
relieve the pilot of the duty of exercising caution.11 Thus, it may
be said that the court decisions placed strong emphasis upon the
primary responsibility of the pilot for the operation of the aircraft
even during those times when the aircraft was within the airport
control zone."
I"Smerdon v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 929 (D. Mass. 1955). Pilot's contributory negligence barred recovery when, after being informed of visibility below FAA weather minimums, he requested and was granted clearance to land
and subsequently crashed after the aircraft entered a fog bank.
" New York Airways, Inc. v. United States, 283 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1960).

1United States v. Schultetus, 277 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 828 (1960). The case involved a midair collision between a Cessna 170

and a Cessna 140 over the airfield. ATC had failed to have the Cessna 170 alter

course and the Cessna 140 yield. The appellate court reversed the trial court's
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In spite of the fact that several decisions involved situations
in which ATC could have avoided the catastrophe by merely
doing "something extra" in the way of warning, 3 it was consistently held that the primary responsibility for the safe operation of
the aircraft rested with the pilot. The result was not altered when
the pilot's vision was partially blocked due to the unusual attitude
of the aircraft.' The primary responsibility of the pilot was said
to survive even those emergency situations in which the pilot was
incorrectly informed of the status of the landing gear by instruments aboard the aircraft and ATC was in a position to determine
if the landing gear were properly down.'
The emphasis the courts have placed upon the primary responsibility of the pilot in landing situations became somewhat modified when a theory of "reciprocal" duty was developed in Maryland ex. rel. Meyer v. United States." In holding the government
liable for the negligence of ATC, the court in Meyer declared that
although the pilot is primarily responsible for operation of the aircraft, there is a concurrent, reciprocal duty on behalf of ATC that
is not neutralized by the pilot's own negligence.
The real upheaval in liability concepts, however, came in Ingham
v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc." which was perhaps the first case to
assert that something more than robot-like obedience to operating
procedures was required of ATC." This attitude was quickly reinforced when it was held in United States v. Furumizo'9 that there
finding of ATC negligence by reliance on ATC's warning of "Traffic, Cessna
crossing in front of you" as being sufficient.
13Id.

1'United States v. Miller, 303 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 955 (1963). This was a situation in which one pilot was in a left bank while
the other aircraft was approaching from the right.
15Stratmore v. United States, 206 F. Supp. 665 (D. N.J. 1962). See also Wenzel v. United States, 291 F. Supp. 978 (D. N.J. 1968), afl'd, 419 F.2d 260 (3d

Cir. 1969). Pilot was given incorrect information by ATC regarding the length

of the runway. Experiencing engine trouble, the pilot overshot the runway, and

while attempting a "go around" crashed 1+ miles from the field.
1"257 F. Supp. 768 (D.D.C. 1966). A U.S. Air Force T-33 overtook and collided with a commercial airliner on final approach.
17373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967). ATC had
delayed the reporting of a change in weather, a reducing ceiling, for a period of
twelve minutes.
1"Id. at 235.

"381 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1967). The pilot had been given the procedures
manual warning regarding wake turbulence, but he proceeded to land before the
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was a duty to repeat a previous warning when it was apparent to
ATC that the pilot was proceeding in disregard of the warning
into obvious danger. The basis for the holding was the court's
belief that there was an "overriding duty" of safety that went
beyond the dictates of the procedures manual and required that
the warning be repeated.'0
Although the trend toward increasing liability resulted in some
initial confusion, the delegation of responsibility between pilot and
controller rapidly became more solidified. The pilot, as a result

of this solidification, was still held primarily responsible for operation of the aircraft, but his responsibility was predicated upon his
having been informed of all facts necessary for safe flight. Likewise, the controller was responsible to give the warnings specified
in the manuals, warn of dangers reasonably apparent to him and

delay clearance if necessary."' This duty to warn a landing aircraft
of known dangers has been recently applied to fixed objects on the
ground2 unless the dangerous condition has existed long enough

to have become published in aviation advisories."
Although a great deal of discussion by the courts relates to the

question of primary responsibility, the underlying, pivotal point for
determining liability has been "control."' As a result, under IFR
conditions, when the aircraft is under positive control by ATC,
negligence is more easily imposed than during VFR conditions.
Assessing liability on the basis of "control," however, does not provide a workable formula when one recognizes that while the pilot
is in the traffic pattern preparing to land, he cannot deviate from
prescribed procedure without prior ATC clearance except to avoid
time required for turbulence to dissipate had elapsed. As he did so, ATC merely
watched.
10 Id. at 968.
"1American Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 180, 193 (5th Cir. 1969).
The court enumerated these as "standards of duty ...deduced from Schultetus,
Hartz and Ingham."
"Harris v. United States, 333 F. Supp. 870 (N.D. Tex. 1971). ATC was held
negligent for failure to warn the pilot that he was below the normal height for
clearance of a power line obstruction since the controller knew the pilot was unfamiliar with the field.
23Blount Brothers Corp. v. State of Louisiana, Bd. of Comm'rs, 333 F. Supp.
327 (E.D. La. 1971). The pilot had failed to check a NOTAM (Notice to Airmen) prior to departure, regarding dangerous conditions existing at the destination airfield.
"Comment, Air Traffic Control: Hidden Danger in the Clear Blue Sky, 34
J.Am L. & CoM. 255, 266 (1968).
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collision with other aircraft.' This condition of regulated flight, in
addition to the significant dependence upon ATC guidance in these
situations, tends to demonstrate the impropriety of using "control"
as the test of liability.
From the foregoing, it is possible to summarize the trend of
expanding ATC liability in landing situations. Although a vague
concept of duty was enunciated almost twenty years ago, the courts'
early experience tended to reflect their belief that the pilot's responsibility for the aircraft was outweighted by ATC negligence only
in the most extreme situations. A vague concept of "control" of
the aircraft was apparently being used as the basis for imposing
liability. With the birth of the concept of reciprocal duty and the
subsequent upheaval of traditional concepts, however, ATC liability
became more easily assessed. Since the landing situation placed
the pilot in need of guidance at a time when ATC was preoccupied
with several aircraft in a relatively confined space, the interdependence between the two situations came to be recognized. As a
result of no longer being considered independent operatives, each
is now required to fulfill all of the obligations imposed upon him
by the regulation manuals. ATC, in addition, is required to warn
the pilot of dangerous conditions of which the pilot may not be
aware. In short, ATC has an "affirmative duty ...

to take reason-

able action to prevent accidents."'" If, however, the pilot proceeds
after having been warned of the danger, ATC is absolved."
B. Take-Off

The general rule originally adopted by the courts in regard to
take-offs was that an ATC clearance for take-off was not an instruction to take-off nor an implied representation that it was safe
for the aircraft to take-off at that particular time. Rather, the ultimate decision regarding take-off rested with the pilot who, because
of his personal skill and knowledge of his plane's capabilities, was
25 Federal Aviation Adm., 14 C.F.R. § 91.87(h) (1973): "Clearances Required.
No pilot may, at an airport with an operating control tower, taxi an aircraft on
a runway, or takeoff or land an aircraft, unless he has received an appropriate
clearance from ATC."
11 Levy, The Expanding Responsibility of the Government Air Traffic Controller, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 401 (1968).
'7 Reidinze v. Trans World Airlines Inc., 329 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Ky. 1971),
rev'd on other grounds, 463 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1972). The judgment was reversed because there was determined to be an issue of fact regarding what information ATC had given the crew, thus precluding summary judgment.
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primarily responsible for the operation of the aircraft. 8 This is conceptually more palatable than those situations involving landings
because during take-off the pilot is less dependent upon ATC for
guidance. This lesser dependence is due to an interrelationship of
various factors including the direction of travel and attitude." The
take-off cases stressing primary responsibility of the pilot and thereby absolving ATC of negligence have dealt with all stages of
preparation before take-off. Cases dealing with the preparatory
stages have included improper loading of the aircraft" and the pilot
not having the correct type of license for the category of flight
contemplated."'
As with the landing cases, there has occurred a significant change
in judicial concepts regarding ATC liability. This dramatic change
was made apparent by Hartz v. United States,'2 a decision that has
been described as "perhaps an even harder [than Ingham] case
against the Government."'" In the Hartz case, ATC had failed to
give the required manual phraseology " in warning an aircraft of
wake turbulence before take-off. The words "watch the prop wash"
were used by the controller; the court in Hartz, however, imposed
a responsibility to "direct and guide" the departing aircraft in a
manner consistent with safety. The Fifth Circuit's use of the words
"direct and guide" brought into question the continuing viability
of the previous position of the courts relating to the primary
responsibility of the pilot. The process of expanding liability in the
take-off cases has been continued by a recent decision by the Ninth
28 Neff v. United States, 420 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1066
(1968). ATC had failed to warn the crew of a rapidly approaching thunderstorm;
the aircraft crashed on take-off as the storm was directly over the airfield.
2 In take-off, most other aircraft in the pattern are in front of the departing
aircraft. Additionally, wings are level on take-off, in relation to the pilot and not
in the banked attitude encountered in turns on landing, as from downwind to base
leg, or base to final.
20Gibbs v. United States, 251 F. Supp. 391 (E.D. Tenn. 1965). Pilot's contributory negligence in overloading the aircraft to the point of moving the center
of gravity rearward past the safety point was held to defeat his claim against the
government.
" Martens v. United States, 5 Av. Cas. 17,465 (S.D. Cal. 1957).
32 387 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1968).
'3Kreindler, The Responsibility of Air Traffic Control Facilities, 13 N.Y. L.
FORUM 518, 519 (1967).
"FAA, AIR TRAFFic CONTROL PROCEDURES MANUAL 7110.29 § 265.2 (1964).
The section required warning of "CAUTION WAKE TURBULENCE" whenever
there was less than 2500 feet separation behind a heavy jet.
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Circuit, Stork v. United States.' In Stork, it was held that ATC
had a duty to warn pilots that take-off under existing weather conditions violated FAA regulations. The basis for holding ATC negligent was the Ninth Circuit's belief that the clearance could "reasonably be read to constitute a reliable official invitation to proceed."'" The holding in Stork is at wide variance with earlier cases
that had held that an ATC clearance, once given, divested ATC
of any responsibility and "the operation of the aircraft [became]
the sole responsibility of the pilot, with which the air traffic controller is not to interfere ....
The trend toward expansion of ATC liability, as exemplified by
Hartz and Stork, was quickly hailed as the proper policy choice
by the courts, i.e. preferring safety over economy and convenience. 8 Others, however, in agreeing with the soundness of expanding ATC liability because of heavy reliance on the service,
expressed some doubt regarding the desirability of burdening ATC
with the question of exercising judgment in those ambiguous situations lying between clear violation of FAA weather minimums and
marginal conditions."9
A recent case dealing with take-off has, to a degree, reversed the
previously dramatic increase in ATC liability."0 From this case it
appears that the duty of ATC to warn of hazards in take-off applies
only to those situations in which a violation of FAA regulations
exists contemporaneous with ATC's ability to warn. Therefore,
once the pilot departs under VFR conditions, there is no duty to
deny clearance because of the probability that he will encounter
adverse weather. If the ability of ATC to warn is contemporaneous
5 430 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1970). A non-scheduled carrier had received takeoff clearance while weather was below minimums. The crash occurred 50-100 feet
after liftoff with great loss of life to a college football team returning home from
a game.
"I1d.at 1108.

" See American Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 180, 193 (5th Cir.
1969).
88
Note, 49 TEX. L. REV. 406, 411 (1971).
'gNote, 24
4

VAND.

L. REV. 189, 195 (1970).

Spaulding v. United States, 455 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1972). Pilot had been

told of overcast skies and approaching thunderstorms along his proposed route.
Forty-five minutes after take-off he reported that he had lost VFR conditions
and although ATC had established radar contact, it was lost as the aircraft de-

scended to the crash. The pilot alleged ATC negligence in failing to prevent the
take-off or order a 180" turn to return to the departure point.
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with the hazard encountered, however, it has been held that the
failure of ATC to warn is negligence even when the hazard is
objects on the ground.'
The trend of expanding liability in take-off situations, although
perhaps not as dramatic as in the landing situations, is nevertheless as discernible. While the earlier decisions had held that a takeoff clearance was not an instruction or implied representation to
proceed, recent decisions place upon ATC a duty to guide and
direct departing aircraft. More significantly, this duty encompasses
an obligation to warn that the take-off under existing conditions
violates FAA regulations. The expanded duty to warn, however,
exists only when the violation of the regulations is contemporaneous
with ATC's ability to warn.
C. Enroute Collision or Crash
During periods when the aircraft is enroute to its destination, the
pilot is less dependent upon ATC guidance than at any other time.
As a result, it is understandable that those attempting to prove
ATC negligence in this situation have been faced with difficult, if
not insurmountable obstacles when ATC has complied with all
applicable regulations. Again, the conceptual framework or test
is that of "control."'' This dichotomy on the basis of "control"
can be easily demonstrated by a review of case history. From this
review, it becomes evident that when a pilot was under VFR conditions, it was virtually impossible to sustain an allegation of ATC
negligence; alternatively, while under IFR operation, negligence
was sustainable at the slightest deviation by ATC from prescribed
procedures. The most striking example of the first proposition involved the collision of two light aircraft directly over a controlled
airfield. A casual statement by ATC was held to have been sufficient
warning to the pilot. ' This result becomes particularly disturbing
when it is realized that even a slight effort by the controller could
possibly have avoided the tragedy. The second proposition, that
41 Moloney v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). ATC was
negligent in failing to warn the pilot of the presence of workmen near the runway. Although information could have been received listening to a local radio
frequency broadcasting the condition, it was not required by regulations.

"Comment, Air Traffic Control: Hidden Danger in the Clear Blue Sky, 34

J. AIR L. & COM. 255 (1968).

"' See note 12 supra. See also note 14 supra; Stanley v. United States, 239 F.
Supp. 973 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
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the courts impose liability readily when IFR conditions exist, is
qualified to the extent that the pilot must be IFR certificated."

Once all of the IFR requirements are met by the pilot, ATC will
be held liable for the failure to warn of military aircraft maneuvers
along the commercial route,' failure to observe another aircraft
on the radar scope in a collision course' or when one ATC enroute

traffic controller fails to coordinate instructions with another enroute traffic controller that results in a collision course."

This imposition of liability on ATC when IFR situations exist
is not without limit. The pilot, to create a sustainable case, must
have operated his aircraft within all prescribed procedures." Thus,

it may be said that although a special duty by ATC is owed pilots
under IFR conditions, the pilot must transmit the correct information to ATC and comply precisely with all ATC instructions.'
Although a review of the judicial determinations indicates a

softening of attitude toward the primary responsibility of the pilot
during enroute flight, the conceptual upheaval that marked the
landing and take-off situations is not as noticeable in the enroute

situation. This area represents the remaining bulwark of ATC immunity when the controller has complied with all IFR operations
requirements. Under VFR conditions, it is the pilot who is held
to a higher standard of care.'
D. Weather
The few cases dealing with alleged ATC negligence in disseminating weather information also rest on the theory of the pilot's
"Kullberg v. United States, 271 F. Supp. 788 (W.D. Pa. 1964). Pilot crashed
after requesting radar assistance for instrument landing without telling ATC that
he lacked the proper license.
I' United Airlines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964), petition for
cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964). An Air Force aircraft using navigational aid
resulted in an operation within airliner's prescribed airway.
"Maryland ex. rel. Meyer v. United States, 257 F. Supp. 768 (D.D.C. 1966).
4 Cattaro v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Va. 1964).
48
Sawyer v. United States, 297 F. Supp. 324 (E.D.N.Y. 1969). Pilot was over
seven miles outside the authorized holding position and had also failed to notify
ATC of some inoperative navigational equipment.
49White v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
Two airline pilots had confirmed to ATC their altitudes which would have provided a 1,000 foot separation; ATC therefore had no way of knowing that one
of the aircraft had departed from its assigned altitude which caused the collision.
See also Annot., 35 A.L.R.3d 614 (1971).
'I Penny v. United States, 12 Av. Cas. 17,919 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
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primary responsibility. This concept is perhaps based on the fact
that weather is an observable phenomenon that usually is gradual
in affecting the flight of an aircraft (clouds gathering, icing, etc.).
When weather is the critical factor, the imposition of liability appears to rest on whether or not ATC has fulfilled its duty to warn. 1
Any failure or delay in warning of changes in weather conditions
may impose liability on ATC 2 When, however, the latest and most
correct information is provided the pilot, and he nevertheless proceeds, his contributory negligence bars recovery." Moreover, the
failure of ATC to repeat weather information already given will
not be considered negligence when the pilot encounters the danger
gradually.
A significant change in ATC liability occurred at a time corresponding to the upheavals in the areas of landings and take-offs.
Current opinion on the subject indicates that ATC has an affirmative duty to warn a pilot that a proposed flight violates FAA
weather regulations.' Once, however, the pilot has been given all
the available weather information, the decision to continue the
flight is his and he will not then be heard to complain of ATC
negligence." Even this limitation on ATC's duty has been qualified
by an expansive case that held that the failure of ATC to repeat
warnings of approaching adverse weather as the pilot drew closer
to his intended destination was negligence on the part of ATC
In so holding, the court's basis was the dependence of the pilot on
ATC for correct information and guidance. Moreover, a superior
duty was held incumbent on ATC because of greater experience,
superior observation facilities and localized information."

11 Bright v.

United States, 149 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Ill. 1956).

" See note 17 supra.

" DeVere v. True-Flight, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.C. 1967). The tower
operator had advised the pilot of approaching storms. The take-off was nevertheless instituted.
"4 Somlo v. United States, 416 F.2d 640 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397

U.S. 989 (1970). The pilot had received information before departure and enroute; the crash nevertheless resulted from icing on wing surfaces.
" See note 35 supra.

z' Spaulding v. United States, 455 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1972).
s Gill v. United States, 429 F.2d 1072 (5th Cir. 1970). The pilot had been

informed of adverse weather by one flight service station (FSS), but had not
been given a later warning by the FSS closer to his intended destination. Also
the information provided was incorrect.

51 Id. at 1077.
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Since weather is an observable phenomenon and one that the
pilot generally encounters gradually, it is understandable that the
expansion of ATC liability has not made the inroads here that
have been made in the other areas. Once the pilot receives all
pertinent weather information, and if such information is both
timely and correct, his decision to continue the flight will be considered an assumption of the risk.
E. Wake Turbulence
Wake turbulence is the phenomenon of whirling vortices trailing
from the wing tips of large aircraft. Light aircraft are particularly
susceptible to violent changes in attitude when encountering these
vortices." Recently, it has been determined that medium-sized
commercial airliners are also endangered by the vortices of the
"jumbo jets.""
Early cases dealing with ATC negligence in connection with
advising of wake turbulence recognized that the phenomenon,
unique to aircraft flight, is a hazard of which pilots are entitled to
be warned by ATC. This warning was held to be obligatory if the
existence of wake turbulence is known to the controller on the
basis that safety should not be sacrificed because of the need to
expedite air traffic flow."' Subsequent decisions, however, appeared
to engage in a process of distinguishing wake turbulence from those
situations in which other factors could be considered causal. For
example, a failure of the pilot to prove that the accident would not
have happened but for the failure of ATC to warn of wake turbulence precluded recovery." Likewise, an experienced pilot who
1 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, Aerodynamics 201 (1967).
"NTSB, AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT NTSB-AAR-73-3, at 21 (1973) (Crash
of Delta Air Lines DC-9 encountering vortex emitted by an American Airlines
DC-10 on May 30, 1972, at Greater Southwest International Airport, Fort Worth,
Texas).
1Johnson v. United States, 183 F. Supp. 489 (E.D. Mich. 1960), aff'd, 295
F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1961). A Cessna followed an Air Force B-47 in landing. ATC
was held negligent despite the government's contention that the imposition of a
duty on ATC to take wake turbulence into account would severely impede traffic

flow.
"Wenninger v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 499 (D. Del. 1964), aff'd, 352
F.2d 523 (3d Cir. 1965). The pilot had alleged that there was a duty of ATC
to issue warnings about military aircraft's use of a navigational aid. The cause
of the crash was claimed to have been turbulence from the military aircraft. See
also Thingulstad v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 551 (S.D. Ohio 1972). There was
no evidence that the failure to issue warnings of wing tip vortices resulted proxi-
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reasonably ought to have recognized the potential hazard under
the circumstances, the time lapse before encountering any turbulence and lack of knowledge in the industry about wake turbulence
were in one case enough to absolve ATC of negligence allegedly
due to deficient warnings."
The trend toward expanding ATC liability discernible in other
areas is also evident in the wake turbulence situations. The cases
show an emerging concept of responsibility in this area. The controller has a duty to consider wake turbulence when granting clearances, to issue warnings when turbulence may be a factor and to
continue to reissue warnings if it appears that the pilot has not
fully appreciated the hazards. A mere warning has been held insufficient when the controller should have realized that the pilot
was commencing an "extremely hazardous or suicidal"" flight. The
warning prescribed in the regulations must be provided first,' then
"something extra" may be required of the controller to do what
is possible to prevent the disaster. Additionally, a growing concern exists among FAA officials that the traditional "CAUTION
WAKE TURBULENCE" warning may not be enough since the
frequency of use has diminished its effectiveness. This potential for
requiring more emphasis in warning has not been litigated to date,
but the continued complacency of pilots after receiving the warning, termed the "cry wolf syndrome," has been recognized in various FAA publications."
Because of the uniqueness of wake turbulence as a hazard primarily encountered around airports, there is a continuing responsibility of ATC to warn pilots of its potential existence. The controller must, however, be aware of the danger before being held
to a duty to convey the warning. A recent decision, Lightenburger
v. United States," has held that when a period of time in excess of
mately in the crash of aircraft. Rather, the evidence indicated that the crash was
caused by the heart failure of the pilot.
" Franklin v. United States, 342 F.2d 581 (7th Cir. 1965). See also Wasilko
v. United States, 300 F. Supp. 573 (N.D. Ohio 1967), aff'd, 412 F.2d 859 (6th
Cir. 1969). ATC was found negligent, but the pilot's contributory negligence in
failing to know the danger of vortices was held a bar to recovery.
381 F.2d at 962.
"387 F.2d at 873.
'NTSB, AIRCRAFT AccIDENT REPORT NTSB-AAR-73-3, at 15 (1973).
67 460 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1972). An IFR pilot, in executing a precision radar
approach, had been guided beyond the point where he had previously been told
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the normal dissipation time for wake turbulence has elapsed, ATC
cannot be held to have been negligent due to the lack of foreseeability of the dangerous event.
There have been two primary theories advanced to explain
ATC's high duty of care in the wake turbulence situations. The
first is that the controllers are considered to be in a better position
to observe the take-off and landings of large aircraft that precipitate
this hazard and to take some affirmative action to avert the danger.
The second and more important theory is that the pilot cannot see
this invisible phenomenon and when wake turbulence is encountered he can do little to extricate himself from the situation.
II.

WEAKENED DEFENSES

It is uncertain whether the expansion in ATC liability is the
result of technical defects in the traditional defenses or a recognition by the courts that "something extra" is required of ATC because of the significant danger to the multitudes of persons in
commercial and general aviation. It cannot be disputed, however,
that this expansion has had as it corollary the weakening of those
defenses. As a result of this relationship, it is necessary to examine
the defenses and evaluate their continuing viability in light of the
physical situations involved.
A. Exceptions Under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)
Since a suit based on ATC negligence must be brought under
the FTCA,"' it is essential that the restrictions imposed by that
statute be consulted. The first defense asserted by the government
was that of the "discretionary function" exception to FTCA liability."' The basis of the "discretionary function" defense is that
the government is not vicariously liable for the acts of its employees
if the allegedly negligent act involves judgment or the exercise of
discretion. If, however, the employee is merely performing the
that guidance would terminate and had been given no warning of wake turbulence. A period of ten minutes passed between the departure of an airliner and
the arrival of the light plane. Five to six minutes is normally sufficient for wake
turbulence to dissipate.
e8 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970), supra note 9.
69 28 U.S.C. S 2680(a) (1970): "Any claim based upon an act or omission of
an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute
or regulation . . . or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function . . ." (emphasis added).
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operational tasks of prescribed procedures, there will be liability
for any negligent acts or omissions. The defense, however, was
nullified in Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Company"0 when it
was held that ATC's functions are operational. The court in Eastern went on to state that, "discretion was exercised when it [the
government] decided to operate the tower but the tower personnel
had no discretion to operate it negligently."" Since the government
had assumed a role that might have been assumed by private industry, it was held liable for the negligent acts of its controllers in performance of their duties."' The failure of the courts to recognize
that in some situations ATC does exercise discretion has been
criticized. The basis of this criticism rests on the refusal of the
courts to consider the discretion that a controller may exercise,
rather than letting the level of operation be determinative."
Another FTCA exception that has been relied on by the government to a lesser degree is that of "misrepresentation."" The basis
of this defense is that the government is not liable for the acts of
its employees for deception or inaccurate portrayal of a situation.
Its use has been limited to those situations in which ATC has
allegedly supplied the pilot with incorrect information. Although
the defense was raised in several cases, the viability was impaired
when the courts began to characterize the situations as not actually
involving any misrepresentation by ATC. Rather, the courts emphasized that ATC errors in providing information were either the
negligent performance of operational tasks" or an implication of
no danger." One court has even stated that although negligent misrepresentations were applicable, the exception was not sufficiently
broad to cover every "operational malfunction by the govern70221

F.2d at 77. See note 8 supra.

Id.

71

7

at 74. See also Dalhite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953); Indian
Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
1Id.

7'Note, The Federal Tort Claims Act: Discretion and the Air Traffic Con-

troller, 38 J. AIR L. & CoM. 413, 425 (1972).
'Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1970): "any claim arising
out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution,
abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit or interference with contract rights." (emphasis added).
5 335 F.2d at 398.

76234 F. Supp. at 505 (dictum).
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ment."7 ' Thus, it may be said that the statutory exceptions to the
FTCA no longer are a viable defense for the government. Instead,
the traditional defenses of common law negligence are used as the
government seeks to absolve ATC of liability.
B. No Duty
The defense of "no duty" has been relied upon heavily by the
government and has become one of the two most effective arguments for absolving ATC of liability. This defense has been asserted
in those situations in which an accident results even though ATC
has performed all of the functions outlined in the appropriate procedures manual or when ATC remained inactive and the procedures manual was silent on the specific situation giving rise to
the accident. The ATC procedures manual outlines and specifies
things that the controller must do in certain situations; the manual
goes further in some instances to specify the exact language to be
used."' Once these requirements have been performed by ATC, the
government contends, there is no duty to do anything else.
The defense weakened with the emergence of what has been
termed the "Good Samaritan" rule. This rule holds that if ATC
undertakes an act that engenders reliance, it must continue to perform that act with due care or be held negligent."' The "Good
Samaritan" idea was quickly followed by cases apparently imposing
on ATC the duty to aid in the operation of aircraft even when what
was required would be beyond the letter of the regulations, such
as providing additional warnings." Thus, although ATC will be
held liable in those situations where it fails to give the regulation
warning, it may also be held liable when the required warning
given is later deemed insufficient.
This expansion of what may be required of the controller was
rapidly followed by an apparent expansion of what may be re77 373 F.2d 227, 239; See also United States v. Newstadt, 366 U.S. 696, 702

(1961)

(exemption upheld).

7For an example of required terminology, see note 34 supra.
7 An example of the rule is that the government may be under no obligation,

absent a statute, to provide medical care to discharged veterans. When it does

provide this medical care and does so negligently, it will be liable under the FTCA.
Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227, 236 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 931 (1967).
"1381 F.2d at 968; compare with Somlo v. United States, 274 F. Supp. 827
(N.D. Ill. 1967), aff'd, 416 F.2d 640 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989
(1970).
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quired by the ATC operating regulations. That is, not only will
the controller be held to be obligated to do more than the regulations require, but the regulations may be reinterpreted to include
something more than had previously been read into them.8' Yet,
this "something extra" duty will be required of ATC only for information or warnings that the pilot could not receive elsewhere,
such as aviation advisories.' ATC's duty, however, is not always
paramount to the pilot's primary responsibility and in situations
where dependence on ATC is not great, the pilot must fend for
himself, as when he gradually encounters bad weather.8 Additionally, there must always exist a causal connection between the deficiency of the ATC information given and the resultant accident
or the plaintiff's cause will fail."' If the danger is unknown to the
pilot, however, it has been held that a causal connection does
exist.'
The "no duty" defense is still very much a force to be reckoned
with. There are, though, particular requirements that must be met
by ATC and on which the question of duty and its breach may
ultimately rest. First, ATC must complete all of the requirements
imposed by the operations manuals. Secondly, the question of
whether or not ATC must go beyond the manuals' requirements
apparently rests on a "reasonable man" standard; the courts will
inquire into what a reasonable man with the equivalent knowledge
of the controller would have done under similar circumstances. The
"reasonable man" test, perhaps, is a balancing process between the
immensity of harm possible and the additional burden placed on
the controller under the particular set of circumstances. Lastly, the
controller will be required to exercise judgment in emergency
situations and not merely function as an automaton. He must do
more than merely follow the dictates of prescribed procedures. The
controller will not be liable, as a result, when he has done what
the operating manuals require and then exercised ordinary judgment in fulfilling his obligation to do "something extra."
8' 430 F.2d 1104.
82 333 F. Supp. 327.
83441 F.2d at 744-45.

"460 F.2d at 397.
"333
5
F. Supp. at 873. See also 335 F.2d at 398; and Rowe v. United States,
272 F. Supp. 462, 471 (W.D. Pa. 1964).
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C. Primary Responsibility
The defense of "primary responsibility" is in reality a corollary
to the "no duty" defense. The government often contends that there
was no duty for the controller to act, and secondarily, that even
if there were a duty, the primary responsibility for the safety of
the aircraft rests with the pilot. The theory of the defense rests on
the notion that the pilot is well trained and experienced and should
be capable of properly operating his aircraft. The pilot's relationship with ATC, then, is that of an independent operator. Each has
a separate distinct function to perform that bears no relation to the
function being performed by the other.
.nitially, ATC responsibility was held to terminate at the departure from the control zone.86 A particularly disturbing case held
that even in the control zone, the negligence of ATC does not override the pilot's responsibility. 7 These rather extreme applications
of the "primary responsibility" defense were weakened when there
emerged the concept of "concurrent responsibility" to describe the
relationship between ATC and the pilot.88 Under the concept of
"concurrent responsibility," both controller and pilot have flight
safety functions to perform at any particular point in time." The
concurrent responsibility concept later evolved into the theory of
reciprocal duty."' Under this theory of reciprocal duty, both the
controller and pilot have a duty toward each other-their relationship is a two-way street. The benefit of the theory to plaintiffs, however, was partially abated whenever VFR flight existed and there
was little dependence on ATC for guidance. 1 Resting as it apparently did on the situation of the VFR/IFR "control" test for liability, it posed a significant obstacle for plaintiffs."
The emphasis upon "primary responsibility" of the pilot can be
"1Smerdon v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 929 (D. Mass. 1955).
17277 F.2d 322.

"See note 16 supra.
"This weakening, however, was followed by a period of vacillation and a
hesitancy to depart from precedent, particularly under VFR conditions. Stanley
v. United States, 239 F. Supp. 973 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
" See note 16 supra. See also Hochrein v. United States, 283 F. Supp. 317
(E.D. Pa. 1965). ATC reciprocal duty said to arise only after it had fulfilled all
of the procedural obligations with respect to warnings.
1 Tilley v. United States, 375 F.2d 678 (4th Cir. 1967).
"Aviation-Liability For Accidents Involving Private Aircraft, 20 DEF. L. J.
352 (1971).
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criticized when recognition is given to the true state of affairs facing
a pilot in situations within an airport traffic area where the majority of accidents occur. He is not a free agent allowed to traverse
the skies unbridled. There are definite procedures relating to altitude, right-of-way and traffic direction to which he must conform
or face possible suspension of his license. A heavy burden is placed
on the pilot by holding him primarily responsible for aircraft operation when virtually ever movement requires the prior clearance by
ATC" In recognition of this situation, the courts should come to
place greater emphasis on the concept of reciprocal duty. In so
doing, dependency will emerge as the true test and the VFR/IFR
dichotomy will be recognized as only an expression of that dependency relationship along a continuum."4
III.

POSSIBLE RAMIFICATIONS

The expansion in ATC liability has led to an environment
whereby any party contributing to an accident will have to pay
damages. This result flows primarily from the recognition of the
indispensable role of the ATC in the modem aviation system and
the realization that with increased reliance on government services,
there must be government responsibility for failures.'
Accordingly, it is possible to speculate on some of the possible
ramifications. The most obvious effect is that ATC is no longer insulated from liability; therefore, plaintiffs, whether passengers, pilots
or representatives of their estates, can now seek recovery from
the government with a greater expectation of eventually receiving
compensation." This, however, has the corresponding cost to the
public of the government's defense of these suits and an increased
burden upon the federal judiciary. This cost to the public, however, pales to insignificance when weighed against the injustices
that result when litigants are denied reasonable access to recovery.
A facet of this effect is that plaintiffs now have a financially responsible defendant; therefore, suits are no longer an exercise in
" See note 25 supra.
94 Only such a concept as a continuum of dependence between pilot and con-

troller adequately conveys the true relationship between them.
Kreindler, The Responsibility of Air Traffic Control Facilities, 13 N.Y. L.
FORUM 518, 521 (1967).
" Comment, Causes of Action in Domestic Commercial Aviation: Their Classification, Application, and Possible Solution, 7 HOUSTON L. REV. 461, 471 (1970).
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futility because defendants cannot pay the damages awarded to
plaintiffs. This aspect is of pivotal importance when a situation
exists in which the plaintiff has an option of whom he shall sue.
In many cases, the plaintiff who would otherwise be faced with an
insolvent defendant (another pilot, small carrier, etc.) now can
look to the financial resources of the United States Government.
As a result, and perhaps in recognition of the fact that damages
are being awarded in excess of the actual loss suffered by plaintiffs,
there has been an increasing tendency by the Justice Department
not to litigate cases, but to settle them out of court."
If it is assumed that the primary purpose of ATC is to ensure the
safe operation of aircraft flights, the question then arises whether
this primary objective of aviation safety has been enhanced by the
trend toward increasing ATC liability. In other words, does the
past history of aviation accidents support a conclusion that increased liability has resulted in an improved safety record as evidenced by a decline in aviation accidents involving ATC responsibility?
Reference to the available statistics does not provide a definitive
answer. For example, during the period 1965-1968, there averaged approximately twelve accidents per year in which traffic control personnel were cited as a cause while the period 1970-1971
shows an average of fifteen accidents per year. 8 From this simplistic comparison, the conclusion is disturbingly attractive that the
imposition of increased liability has not led to any decline in the
number of accidents in which ATC was cited as a cause. When
these figures are related to total aircraft activity (to provide due
consideration to the significant increase in aviation activity during
this period of time from 1965 to 1971), it is impossible to draw
11 FROMM, AVIATION SAFETY, LAW & CONTEMPT. PROB. 590, 617 (1968).
Rather than appeal, the Justice Department recently settled out of court. Harris
v. United States, 333 F. Supp. 870 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
" Statistics for 1972 have not been published to date. Statistics for 1965-1968
derived from NTSB,
IMITY

TO

AIRPORT

CAUSE AND RELATED FACTOR TABLE-AcCIDENTS BY PROXINVOLVING TRAFFIC CONTROL PERSONNEL, AIRPORTS, AND

AIRWAYS FACILITIES-U.S. CIVIL AVIATION (June 23, 1969) (provided by Letter
from C. 0. Miller, Director, Bureau of Aviation Safety, National Transportation
Safety Board, to Author, May 22, 1973). Statistics derived for 1970-1971 from
Computer Printout, "Listing of Accidents Involving Air Traffic Control as a
Cause/Factor-U. S. Civil Aviation 1970-1971" (Department of Transportation,
National Transportation Safety Board, 1973) (provided by letter from Fritz L.
Puls, General Counsel, National Transportation Safety Board, to Author, June 25,
1973).
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a conclusion because of difficulties in purifying the available data."
It can, however, be said that aircraft accidents during part of the

applicable period have shown a continuous decline in relation to
the number of hours and miles flown.1" The significant question
remaining unanswered, however, is whether this decline in aircraft
accidents is the result of ATC improvement, safer aircraft, more
sophisticated pilots and systems or a composite of all of these.
Additionally, the increasing liability that has been thrust upon
ATC has undoubtedly resulted in a blow to the image of the serv-

ice's professionalism within the FAA itself. Air traffic controllers,
perhaps more than any other class of persons, are aware of the
weighty burden of aviation safety they must bear. Charges of

"negligence" and "dereliction of duty" have a definite impact upon

the attitude of both ATC and FAA management toward improving
their record in order to protect their own sanity and to blunt public

criticism. This desire for improvement and fear of public criticism
has been reflected in improvements in ATC personnel and the

operational equipment at their disposal, thereby enhancing the
chances for safer skies.' Yet, much more needs to be done.
The difficulties facing ATC in its efforts to improve were made
apparent to Congress when hearings were conducted into the sys-

tem in 1970 as the result of a work "sick-out" that partially para"The significant increase in the volume of air traffic is reported annually as
Congress conducts hearings on the FAA budget appropriations. For the period
1965-1968, see Hearings on Dept. of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriationsfor 1970 Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 119 (1969). For the period 1969-1970, see
Hearings on Dept. of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations foil
1973 Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 3, at 796 (1972).
'FAA, 1970 STATISTICAL HANDBOOK 238, 246 (1970).
101
Improvements have been made in both personnel and equipment. For example, the FAA now requires (implemented since 1968) controllers to successfully complete a battery of aptitude tests that have a minimum qualifying score.
See FAA-AM-71-40, AIR TRAFFIC APTITUDE MEASURES OF MILITARY AND FAA
CONTROLLER TRAINEES 2-3, 29 (Oct. 1971). See also FAA-AM-68-14, A COMPARATIVE OF AIR TRAFFIC APTITUDE-TEST MEASURES INVOLVING NAVY, MARINE
CORPS, AND FAA CONTROLLERS (Sept. 1968). Research is also being conducted

into improved wake turbulence detection. FAA Prepares Airport Tests of Four
Wake-Vortex Sensors, Av. Week & Space Technology, Nov. 13, 1972, at 25. Sophisticated satellite-ground based control systems are also being envisioned. Klass,
Promise Seen for Hybrid Air Traffic Control, Av. Week & Space Technology,
Sept. 18, 1972, at 52-3. See also Reppenthal, Coping With the Aerial Traffic Jam,
Stanford Today, May, 1969.
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lyzed the nation's aviation system and caused the following analysis
to be printed:
The Nation's Air Traffic Control System Is On A Collision
Course With Disaster
At present, we must depend upon an inadequate number of air
controllers. These controllers must rely upon obsolete and inadequate equipment. They must cope with a growing stream of aircraft carrying increasingly larger passenger loads. The controllers
must guide aircraft under their protection through airspace often
crowded with hundreds of unidentified and uncontrolled aircraft.
They must funnel them to and from scores of inadequate air terminals, many of which are fast approaching the outer limit of their
capacity, or have reached a point of dangerous saturation.
Meanwhile, the Federal Aviation Administration, which Congress
created in 1958 to provide the Nation with an adequate traffic control system, has stumbled badly in a second attempt to apply modern technology to the growing traffic control problem."'2
The increasing liability being thrust upon ATC creates more
pressures in a profession already fraught with pressure. It would
be mere conjecture, moreover, to state that the increased liability
to which the controllers are subjected will encourage them to perform their functions with more care. The public is now aware of
the stress experienced by controllers as evidenced by the testimony
of the controllers themselves concerning the pressures they must
endure."' The constant execution of life or death decisions in short
time frames and the consistent adherence to strict standards of perfection is a threat to the rational thought processes of controllers.
FAA proficiency tests indicate that controllers' abilities to make
on Problems Confronting FAA in the Development of an Air
Traffic Control System for the 1970s Before the Government Activities Subcomm.
of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at
102Hearings

1 (1970).
1"1 Hearings on Dept. of Transportationand Related Agencies Appropriations
for 1971 Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 1035 (1971):

Mr. Stamper: Mr. Raga talked about numbers of aircraft and you
seemed interested in it. I have a letter in my own file, a letter of
commendation for having worked 32 aircraft at one time. This was
sheer chaos!
Mr. Yates: I am glad I wasn't in one of those planes.
Mr. Stamper: They commended me for this. I didn't even know my
own name, I was so busy. I talked incessantly for a period of about
20 minutes. It was really chaos, trying to keep those planes from
colliding.
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quick decisions and to anticipate trouble begin to slide after the
age of forty.' Added to this complex situation is the fact that controllers often view themselves in an adversary role with pilots,

thereby making cooperation between the operatives in the air
safety system more difficult.'

Yet, despite the public awareness of

the near-bedlam environment in which the controller functions, and
the realization that the aviation industry has demonstrated astro-

nomical growth, there has historically been a decline in FAA funding and staffing.' Only recently has there been legislation to provide for early retirement and second career training for controllers."'
Since the problems involved in aircraft crash litigation are
myriad, including: lengthy litigation, expensive discovery procedures, duplication of attorney fees and pressures on federal dockets,"' an alternative to the present system needs to be found.
There are, however, few willing to abandon the present tort lia-

bility system." Rather, there is a call for increased regulation by
imposing strict liability upon the government for aircraft accidents
at controlled facilities."0
IV.

CONCLUSION

Although never precisely enunciated by any court, it is apparent
from the foregoing review of case history that liability of ATC now
exists on what may be called a "continuum of dependence." Briefly
THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 14, 1969, at 107.
0'Block, Pilot v. Controller, FLYING, July, 1972, at 24.

'"

100 This relationship has been presented graphically. Hearings on Dept. of
Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1968 Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations,90th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 92
(1967).
107 Act of May 16, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-297, 86 Stat. 141.
100 Comment, Federal Courts-ProposedAircraft Crash Litigation, 35 Mo. L.
REV. 215 (1970).
10'Comment,
Causes of Action in Domestic Commercial Aviation: Their
Classification, Application, and Possible Solution, 7 HousToN L. REV. 461 (1970).
10 The proposal has already been made regarding the imposition of strict liability upon the commercial carriers, limiting passenger recovery and financing
the system through additional ticket costs. Comment, Domestic Commercial Aircraft Tort Litigation: A Proposal for Absolute Liability of the Carriers, 23 STAN.
L. REV. 569 (1971). The costs of this system could be borne by all of the users,
prorated upon some equitable basis. For a general discussion of the mechanical
considerations involved in devising such a system, see Rottenberg, Liability in Law
and Economics, 55 AM. EcoN. REV. 107 (1965).
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stated, this continuum ranges from the one end where the pilot is
almost totally dependent on ATC for guidance to a situation in
which he is almost totally independent of any ATC presence. An
example of the total dependency situation would be one in which
the pilot is landing an aircraft under IFR, in adverse weather in
the presence of possible wake turbulence. In this situation, ATC
has a duty not only to provide all the information and warnings
required by the manuals, but also to do whatever is reasonably possible to prevent harm to the pilot. Conversely, at the other end
of the spectrum, is the pilot flying under VFR conditions enroute
to his destination. Here, the pilot is totally responsible for the
safety of the aircraft and ATC will only be accountable for what
it can reasonably do when the pilot communicates that he is in
danger. All of the previously-discussed fact situations can be
placed somewhere along this continuum. There is a consistency in
the courts' decisions in ascribing liability to ATC whenever it fails
in the particular duty incumbent upon it at the time by virtue of
the particular situation. Thus, it may be said that the duty of ATC
to pilots is not absolute, rather it is relative to the particular fact
situation involved.
Having evolved to the current position of using dependency as
the true test of liability, the courts have necessarily had to hold
invalid the traditional defenses arising from the exceptions to the
FTCA. As a result, government attempts to absolve ATC of
liability presently center around the common law defenses of "no
duty" and "primary responsibility." Each of these defenses has
likewise been circumscribed by the courts' adherence to a principal
of reciprocal duty that places upon both the pilot and controller a
significant responsibility for safety. From this review of the development of expanded ATC liability, it is possible to predict that future
government actions will be limited to a defense on the facts, rather
than a reliance on the traditional defenses that were viable in an
earlier day.
With the recognition of the correlative emergence of these two
phenomenon-expanded ATC liability and weakened government
defenses-the question of effect upon the air traveling public arises,
but must remain unanswered. Assuredly, deserving litigants now
have a reasonable hope for recovery, but this is not enough. There
would be few who would argue that a reasonable possibility for
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recovery in a a negligence suit is as attractive an alternative as the
accident having never occurred. This then, safer air travel, must
be the primary goal of any judicial attention to the aviation industry. Yet, it cannot be statistically verified that the courts' assessment of liability by reference to the "continuum of dependence"
has had the offsetting effect of improved safety. Improvements have
been made, but it is submitted that focusing attention entirely upon
ATC as the defect is shortsighted. Speaking from the standpoint of
practical experience, it is doubtful that the actions of pilot or controller are greatly influenced by the threat of potential legal liability.
The decisions made and the actions taken by both pilot and controller are the ones each deems appropriate under the circumstances, unrelated to any considerations of future liability. Safety
and concern for the welfare of others undoubtedly dominates the
choices made by pilot and controller. Mistakes happen, accidents
occur and lives are lost in the execution of decisions involving aircraft flight, but it is the entire system that requires correction rather
than merely singling out one element as the cause of all misfortune.
If the expansion in ATC liability be the first step in greater recognition of the entire problem, then it has served a needed function.
If so, the reliance by the courts upon what has been termed the
"continuum of dependence" is commendable as a recognition of
the true state of the relationship between ATC and pilot. It is a
recognition that the relationship is really a system in dynamic
equilibrium between man and machines. To improve the safety of
the system, each of the components must be improved-pilot, controller, machinery and interaction-rather than placing the burden
upon only a few of the constituent parts.
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